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Abstract 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in calls for change.  Commentators suggested that 
co-operatives, in particular credit unions, could provide accountability and sustainability 
through their open governance and mutual status.  However, such suggestions 
assumed that co-operative principles and practice continued to underpin the efficacy of 
co-operative banking, and that credit unions, one of the most prevalent forms of co-
operative banking, could offer a viable financial alternative.  Instead, in the case of 
Cyprus, the financial crisis and the associated aftershocks triggered the nationalisation 
and demutualisation of credit unions.  This prompted the researchers to question both 
the viability of a co-operative banking future and the extent to which co-operative 
principles were shaping decision making, governance, accountability and sustainability.  
A case study approach was adopted to explore the degree to which co-operative 
principles still shaped credit union thinking and stakeholder relationships.  As is the 
case elsewhere within the co-operative movement, the findings point the fact that 
governance is weakened by low membership participation and that the principles are no 
longer universally applied.  Credit unions, if not co-operative banking, may not offer the 
financial assurances that commentators have called for.  Moreover, the guiding 
principles may no longer be embedded within the fabric of the movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Co-operatives, credit unions, co-operative principles, governance, 
financial crisis. 
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Credit unions, Co-operatives, sustainability and accountability in a time of 
change a case study of credit unions in Cyprus. 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial crisis and associated aftershocks stimulated much debate regarding 
financial probity, accountability and governance.  Commentators from a range of 
professional and academic backgrounds called for more transparent and responsible 
banking (Richter, 2009; Gibbons 2011) and a return to simpler, more humanistic, ethical 
and fairer financial models (Farrands, 2011; O’Brien, 2011).   
 
Co-operative banking, a not-for-profit, mutualised financial model may represent an 
attractive alternative to financial services’ consumers.  Co-operative banks and credit 
unions are built upon co-operative principles, ensuring transparency, democracy and 
accountability; they serve the membership not a globalised corporate identity.  However, 
to what extent are co-operatives still governed and shaped by mutually beneficial 
principles?  Research suggests that co-operatives may no longer be the paragons of 
virtue they once were (Wilson and MacLean, 2012; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and 
Plummer, 2013; Cabo and Rebelo, 2015).   
 
This paper reports on a recent research project which explored the extent to which 
underpinning co-operative principles continued to shape the actions, accountability and 
governance of credit unions.  It is structured as follows.  Firstly, this paper aims to 
answer the following questions: what are the underpinning co-operative principles and 
do they still resonate within credit unions?  Secondly, the research approach is outlined 
and findings noted.  Finally, the paper moves on to conclusions and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
 
Co-operatives and Principles 
 
“A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned 
and democratically-controlled enterprise”. 
(International Co-operative Alliance (ICA, 2011) 
 
Co-operatives are distinctive as they are owned and controlled by the membership 
(Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  They endeavour to create and maintain trusting, long 
lasting, relationships (Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 2014; Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 
2014).  This double identity, ownership and membership, builds personal ties and 
mitigates against information asymmetry and agency problems (Ferri, 2012).  Co-
operatives aim to improve the general socio-economic wellbeing of the membership 
(Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011); and by so doing strengthen the social fabric that binds 
the community together (Jones, 2012, Hossein, 2017).  Members benefit not through 
share value but through the co-operative services they consume (Yair and Davis, 2008).   
 
In Europe co-operative financial institutions continue to play an important role (Ferri, 
Kalmi and Kerola, 2014), engaging primarily in retail banking at a local or regional level 
(Groeneveld, 2015).  At the end of 2016, there were 4,050 regional and local 
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cooperative banks with 79 million members, employing 749,000 people, serving 210 
million customers and managing banking assets of €7 trillion (EACB, 2017a).  
Additionally, co-operative financial institutions have significant local market share.  For 
example, by the close of 2016, the French co-operative banks had 61.4% market share 
of domestic deposits and 59.2% of loans, whereas, in Finland they had 38.8% of 
domestic deposits and 35.4% of loans; in Netherlands they had 34% of domestic 
deposits and in Cyprus the Co-operative Central Bank enjoyed a market share of 26% 
of domestic deposits and 22% of loans (EACB, 2017b). 
 
Co-operatives have traditionally been formed to respond to the needs of the members 
(Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011).  They offer members greater collective negotiating power 
and guard against opportunism and exploitation (Cook, 1995).  Co-operatives have 
flourished due to the shared principles that safeguard member interests and 
differentiate them from investor-owned companies (Fajardo Garcia, 2012). 
 
The seven co-operative principles, as provided by ICA (2012), ensure their values of 
self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equity and solidarity are put into practice: 
  
1st: Voluntary and Open Membership.  Co-operative membership is “voluntary” at the 
point of joining and exiting, and “open” to all who qualify (Papageorgiou, 2004).  
Membership needs to remain attractive, encouraging sustainable benefits (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2012).   
 
2nd: Democratic Member Control.  “Co-operatives are democratic organisations 
controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making 
decisions”, with each member having a vote.  This stems the anthropocentric and 
socioeconomic nature of co-operatives (Papageorgiou, 2004).   
 
3rd: Member Economic Participation.  “Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their co-operative”.  Members are compensated 
based on the value of their co-operative transactions (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
Furthermore, the accumulated undistributed reserves (or intergenerational endowment) 
can be perceived as social capital, a legacy from the existing membership to future 
generations (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).   
 
4th: Autonomy and Independence.  “Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help 
organisations controlled by their members” and “if they enter to agreements with other 
organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so 
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-
operative autonomy”.  This should mean that co-operatives remain independent 
(Papageorgiou, 2004) and that a member should forgo short-term personal interests to 
the long-term common benefit (CSSDA, 2005).  
 
5th: Education, Training and Information. “Co-operatives provide education and training 
for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can 
contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives”.  A communal 
commitment to training and development sets co-operatives aside from traditional 
commercial enterprises (Papageorgiou, 2004) and the associated socioeconomic 
benefits, encourage membership to exercise and strengthen their democratic control 
(Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  Co-operatives should, as part of this principle engage 
with internal and external stakeholders, including the community, to promote the co-
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operative model and ensure continued engagement (Bickle and Wilkins, 2000; 
Papageorgiou, 2004; Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).   
 
6th: Co-operation among Co-operatives.  This means that “co-operatives serve their 
members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working 
together through local, national, regional and international structures”.  The principle 
promotes the economic wellbeing of co-operatives (Birchall, 1997; Birchall and Ketilson, 
2009), encourages collaboration, producing joint ventures, financial support and 
economies of scale (Jones, 2016).   
 
7th: Concern for Community.  ”Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of 
their communities”.  Apart from their principal purpose, to serve the best interests of 
their membership, co-operatives also work for the development of their surrounding 
communities (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005).   
 
Fajardo Garcia (2012) claims that it is these principles and values that differentiate co-
operatives from investor owned organisations.  Furthermore, these principles and 
values facilitate the alignment of members’ interests, permitting them to collectively aim 
towards common goals (Nilsson, 1996).  Moreover, co-operative principles should be 
consistently and continuously applied in the day to day operations (Parnell, 1995).   
 
Having analysed the calls for post-2008 change, from academics and financial 
commentators, it could be argued that co-operatives, and more specifically credit 
unions, should be well positioned to respond with transparent products, tailored made to 
members’ needs.  To date there is little evidence that co-operative financial models are 
being deployed, in scale, to ensure future stability.  Indeed, evidence suggests that 
there is a growing divide between “co-op values” and “co-op business” (Novkovic, 2006, 
p.19).  The literature points to the well accepted validity of the principles, but their 
adoption is entirely optional, and there appears to be some divergence of practice from 
theory (Novkovic, 2008).  Shaw (2007) notes that two of the principles, namely, 
“autonomy and independence” and “member democratic participation”, are less 
universal than they once were, while others go further and note that financial co-
operatives do not follow any of the seven principles (Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and 
Plummer, 2013).   
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that rather than fostering a collective spirit for mutual 
benefit, some co-operatives simply provide a protective shield, where members seek 
individual protection against external forces (Wilson and MacLean, 2012).  Wilson and 
MacLean (2012), researching (mainly) producer co-operatives in Scotland, found 
evidence that the principles were not of any great importance, noting that as time 
passes the principles diminish as a guiding philosophy.  Similarly, Cabo and Rebelo, 
(2015) note a gap between what co-operatives do, and what they proclaim.  These 
findings are also supported by Kelly (2014) whose report suggests that co-operatives no 
longer adhere to the principles, as witnessed by the Co-operative Bank UK’s failure to 
live up to its members’ expectations.   
 
Wilson and MacLean (2012) as well as Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer 
(2013) call for further research to establish the extent to which the principles are 
practiced and indeed what actual role they now play.  A call for financial change, 
harking back to the guiding principles off the co-operative movement, suggested that 
co-operative financial institutions, especially those serving a local community, such as 
credit unions, may offer a more sustainable and equitable financial future.  The initial 
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literature review reinforced such an opinion; however, there does appear to be evidence 
that the principles no longer directly impact on the business.  
 
This paper answers two calls, firstly from the financial commentators who pondered if 
credit unions may at least offer a partial solution to the crisis of 2008.  Secondly it 
addresses concerns expressed regarding the practice, i.e. how do stakeholders 
perceive the guiding principles; and to what extent are the membership actively 
engaged in governance?  The research reported here focused on credit unions; they 
are co-operatives purporting to adhere to the underpinning principles and they are 
locally, community embedded providers of financial services.  
 
 
Research approach  
 
Based on the literature and the calls for further research the authors based their 
investigation around two research questions, namely, how were the principles perceived 
and actioned and; to what extent were the actual membership engaged in the 
democratic process. 
 
The research, which commenced in 2013, was conducted in Cyprus, a country with a 
long tradition of credit unions embedded in local communities and an economy in post-
2008 crisis.  The prevalence of credit unions, combined with the uncertainties of the 
Cypriot financial crisis, provided the context within which to explore issues of 
accountability and governance. 
 
Nine credit unions, based in three towns, agreed to participate with data being gathered 
through a series of structured interviews (employees) and focus groups (membership).  
Additionally, generic credit union statistics were obtained from the Cypriot co-operative 
supervisory body, drawn from a sample of 20 credit unions provided information on 
membership, the last three AGMs and last three Board of Directors’ elections.   
 
Thirty structured interviews were carried out, each of them lasting from 18 to 68 
minutes, involving 4 general managers, 6 managers and 20 staff (15 with 5-9 years of 
experience and 15 with over a decade).  The results of the interviews were summarized 
and returned to the interviewees to confirm both the accuracy and validity of the 
researchers’ understanding.  Furthermore, three focus groups, lasting each for over one 
and a half hours, were undertaken with membership representatives drawn from a 
single credit union, using a purposive sampling process, i.e. recruiting participants that 
were both able and willing to provide data.  Participants belonged to the same 
profession and were members in the same credit union.  The selected credit union was 
known to the researchers and existing contacts were used to recruit participants to the 
focus groups.  
The focus group participants, 10 per group, totalled 20 males and 10 females, of which 
7 of the males and 6 females were retired.  The high number of retired members reflects 
the fact that credit unions are less attractive to a younger clientele. Both individual 
interviews and focus groups were recorded with the permission of the participants.  All 
personal interviews and focus groups were then transcribed and coded in N-Vivo.   
The interviews and focus groups were designed to address both research questions, i.e. 
how were the principles perceived and actioned and; actual membership engagement in 
the democratic process.  The structured interviews contained questions relating to the 
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adherence of credit unions to their founding principles, the level of membership 
participation and involvement, ways to strengthen it, training of employees and the 
membership, communication methods employed, credit unions’ distinguishing features 
and subjects discussed at AGMs.  Similarly, during the focus groups discussions 
revolved around the distinguishing features of credit unions, the level of trust towards 
credit unions, credit unions’ adherence to their founding principles, ageing membership, 
level and quality of membership services, participation, communication and; priorities 
(social Vs economic).  The secondary data sources addressed only the second 
question, i.e. actual membership engagement in the democratic process.  
 
 
Findings 
 
For presentational and analytical purposes, findings have been grouped under each 
principle.  It is worth noting that, the non-adherence to the co-operative principles may 
have been evident well before the financial crisis of 2013 as members were distant, 
there was no co-operative-related training to existing/potential members and the 
younger generations were absent. 
 
1st Voluntary and open membership 
Employees and members readily supported the voluntary and open membership policy.  
Indeed, there were no barriers to entering and/or to exiting the credit unions.  
Occasionally members may be excluded from active membership on legal or health 
grounds.  However, the membership noted that recent regulatory actions, namely the 
State acquiring 99% ownership of the credit unions (a result of the 2013 Cypriot 
financial crisis), may simply make the first principle redundant!  The above findings 
confirm that stakeholders support and value voluntary and open membership.  This is 
line with the extant literature (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; ICA, 2012).  
However, the members’ fears have been confirmed.  In exchange for financial 
assistance of €1,5billion, the Cypriot state obtained 99% of the shares (CCB, 2013) and 
appointed a new Board of Directors, effectively de-mutualising the sector.  The Cypriot 
state has committed to Troika that by June 2020 it will sell at least 75% of its 
shareholding in three chunks of 25% each through private placement or through the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange (Philenews, 2016).  On 18 June 2018, the Cyprus state has 
sold the performing loans and the deposits in Co-operative Central Bank to the second 
largest investor-owned local bank (about half the size of Co-operative Central Bank), 
retaining the property and then Non-Performing Loans itself (Philenews, 2018).   
 
2nd Democratic member control 
Three aspects of the control dimension were examined: 
 
(a) Participation in the Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
Membership participation at AGMs, as reported by the employees, suggested very low 
participation rates.  The majority of employees put the figure at 2% or less.  For 
example, employee IR17 said that “due to the fact that we were celebrating the nth 
anniversary, since the creation of their Co-op, there were many more people in comparison with 
other times but anyway not more than 300 members”, and employee IR8 “there were about 
150- 200 people”, whilst, employee IR27 argued that “there were 90 people in the last Annual 
General Meeting and 35- 40 people including the employees in the Annual General Meeting 
before the last one”.  Moreover, employees suggested that even where there was 
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engagement, that the attending membership, were overly guided by management,  only 
rarely did members request changes to the agenda.  The low participation rate was 
confirmed through data obtained from the office of the Commissioner of the Co-
operative Societies Supervision and Development Authority (CSSDA).  A sample of 
seventeen credit unions showed that recent membership engagement with AGMs never 
exceeded 8% with an average closer to 2%.  Further, the focus groups also indicated a 
lack of engagement, for example:   
“FGN11: We are active in the sense that we are clients.  That means that we do not often attend 
the General Meetings.  Only as clients. 
FGN4: This means that the members are not so active as they should have been”. 
“FGL10: When our own Credit Union existed we were active.  Now we are not. 
FGL2: But even when it existed, we cannot say that all of us were active. 
FGL5: But we only went at the elections”. 
“FGP1: We used to be.  Now we are not”. 
When prompted by the researcher, participants responded to the question “in the past 
were active?” as follows:  
“FGP1: In comparison with now, yes. 
FGP5: No, no {even then} we were not active. 
FGP1: Even if you only go to vote, you are active.  This is because you vote for the Board of 
Directors.” 
 
 
(b) Board of Directors’ elections 
Based on the individual interviews, the vast majority of employees claimed that less 
than 30% of members voted, for example employee IR29 said “I am not sure.  I think that 
not even 25% [of members] do vote”.  The focus groups supported this, indicating that only 
a 30%-40% of members voted:  
“FGN3: 1/3.  I belive that it was 1/3. 
FGN2: 50%. 
FGN6: 60% from what I remember. 
FGN5: 30%. 
FGN4: Approximately 1/3.  Something around there. 
FGN10: Below 1/3.  Sometimes I run as a candidate and I know what is happening.  The 
percentage depend on who the candidates are. 
FGN5: 18%- 20%. 
FGN4: 1/5.”   
The data from CSSDA confirmed the low participation, as for the previous three Board 
elections, for a sample of twelve credit unions, an average of 7% of members 
participated.   
 
(c) Board of Directors candidates  
It was noted that there was often no need to hold elections.  Incumbents sit for a decade 
unopposed and there is often only one candidate per position.  For example, one 
employee, IR10, stated that for the past 15 years there had been no real change: “at the 
elections, most of the members vote.  Naturally, there were some years that the candidates were 
exactly as many as the seats available, something that may have happened twice.  We might have 
had the same Board of Directors for fifteen years with only the president changing”.  Moreover, 
IR25 noted that election calls may attract candidates, but many withdraw if an election 
proves to be needed: “only once we had elections.  The candidates withdrew”.  Furthermore, 
IR9 stated that “I think that there were 6- 7 candidates for 5 positions with only 1- 2 candidates 
being different from the candidates of the previous elections”, and IR5 noted that they “rarely 
we have elections as usually there is a combination of candidates supported by the political 
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parties resulting in three elections in the last twenty years (with the term in office being three 
years) with almost the same people as candidates”.  On a more positive note, some elections 
have seen multiple candidates.  Again, these observations were confirmed by the focus 
groups and CSSDA data (the norm would be 1.5 candidates per Board seat, but often 
credit unions struggled to fill all the Board seats).  
 
The focus groups tended to reinforce the views on participation expressed by the 
employee interviews, for example:  
“FGP8: The reason behind the low number of candidates is the fact that the political parties 
agreed on the candidates they would support thus reducing to the minimum the number of 
independent candidates. 
FGP1: This is correct. 
FGP8: They did not stand a chance on their own”. 
Given the general lack of alternative candidates and the tendency for lections to be non-
contested, the focus groups seemed to be concerned that in newcomers worried about 
feelings of humiliation if they failed to be elected, even when they felt they could offer 
more than the existing Board members:  
“FGL1: How can I run against these people? 
FGL5: Simply because you could be better than them. 
FGL1: This is correct. 
FGL10: But you had to risk in order to get elected. 
FGL1: To risk lose face you mean.” 
 
As to the number of candidates for each available position, members said that only 
around two candidates exist for each seat on the Board of Directors: 
“FGN11: 2,5 candidates for each available position. 
FGN4: Around 15 candidates for 5- 7 positions.  More or less. 
Researcher: 2- 3 candidates for each position? 
FGN3: That is correct. 
FGN5: Somewhere around there.” 
Also,  
“FGL10: Six {for 5 positions}. 
FGL2: Around 20 {for 5 positions}. 
FGL12: 5- 6 {for 5 positions}. 
FGL2: 20 are too much. 
FGL12: 6- 8 mamimum.  We did not show a lot of interest. 
FGP1: There were not many. 
FGP5: 3 candidates for each position. 
FGP8: 2 candidates for each position. 
FGP1: 2 candidates for each position.” 
 
As to the ways credit unions could increase their members’ participation, members 
claimed that credit unions should open up to its members: 
“FGL6: … Our Credit Union could open up a line of communication with its members.  
Something like what we currently do right now, but the members should be able to contribute 
with ideas, expressing their fears/ concerns.  This could be used by the Credit Union to shape its 
future decisions. 
FGL10: Who would organize something like this? 
FGL5: They could be undertaken in the working places of the members”, 
and/or by organizing informal member gatherings where exchange of ideas and 
suggestions can take place: 
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“FGP1: More social interaction e.g. by organizing a pic nic on the mountains where and during 
which all the colleagues would meet and talk.  
FGP2: E.g. at Kykkos mountains. 
FGP1: With a low fare giving us the chance to talk to each other”. 
It seems that members would take part in these kinds of meetings as long as 
management actually spend time to make it happen and personally talked to members 
in order to engage with them: “FGN4: … You could personally ring 40 members, personally, 
and invite them.  You should communicate with the members in order to hear your voice.  You 
oblige him a great more deal if you call him…  Members like to have personal contact….” 
However, members were willing to stop free riding and actually engage with their Credit 
Union in cases where they felt that their personal interests was hurt: “FGP11: Up until 
now we felt that our representatives in the Board of Directors were worthy and thus we felt 
secured.  We did not feel that we had to protest, to shout as everything was fine.  Now, it seems 
that we must start attending.” 
Furthermore, members claimed that current “communication” methods, i.e. sending 
letters to their members is not effective but instead, credit unions should use the 
available technology (e.g., sms, emails): 
“FGN11: By sending letter but they should not wait until it is 2- 3 pages long in order to send it.  
A shorter letter as everybody would read a short letter.  However, when people get a 2, 3 pages 
long letter they will not read it. 
FGN5: Through emails. 
FGN11: Through sms on our mobile telephone. 
FGN11: Through emails but they should not be 3 pages long. 
FGN5: When I see a 2 pages long letter, I immediately throw it away.  No matter what it is.  I 
have my coffee to enjoy and I will not spend my time reading letters.” 
“FGL11: Using the technology. 
FGL12: Through sms.  It is very easy. 
FGL11: Through emails. 
FGL8: Using the technology: using emails, sms.” 
 
Also, members suggested the use of blogs: 
“FGL6: Something a little simpler can be done.  There could be something done with our Credit 
Union’s website. 
FGL5: Create a blog 
FGL6: And everybody could log in and express his thoughts.  Everybody has computers 
nowadays”. 
 
The above findings are at odds with the importance the literature places on democratic 
engagement and control (Fonteyne, 2007).  However, the findings are supported by 
evidence suggesting generally low participation.  Studies in the UK suggest 3% 
participation (Spear 2004); Sweden 3.6% (Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009); and Spain 
6.1% (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo. 2008).   
 
Low member participation has been associated with large and/or mature co-operatives 
(Novkovic, 2006; Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008), or with factors such as a loss of 
cohesion, lack of incentives and transparency (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008), or 
length of director’s tenure (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).   
 
3rd Member economic participation 
Employees noted that members refrain from contributing financially to strengthen their 
credit union due to trust issues, a lack of certainty, and previous personal financial 
losses.  The employees’ perceptions were confirmed by the members themselves.  
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Findings suggest that a sustained economic engagement with the credit union is a thing 
of the past, with recent financial crises, combined with a general lack of engagement, 
cited as the cause.  Literature suggests that ongoing commitment, financial or 
otherwise, by the membership lies at the heart of the co-operative movement 
(Papageorgiou, 2004; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).   
 
4th Autonomy and independence 
All participants believed that credit unions could lose their autonomy and independence 
as a result of the transfer of 99% of the shares to the state.  When asked about their 
future, employees suggested Cypriot credit unions may cease to exist, fearing that they 
will become investor-owned banks or operate as if they were such.  Once again the 
focus groups echoed the fears of the employees.  The co-operative literature (CSSDA, 
2005; Atherton et al., 2011; ICA, 2012) would suggest that the credit unions were amiss 
in not ensuring autonomy and independence when taking receipt of the State’s €1,5 
billion loan.  However, such loss of autonomy is not a new phenomenon (Novkovic, 
2006).  
 
5th Education, training and information 
All, except for one employee, considered that co-operative-related training and 
awareness would be useful, but all noted that their credit unions had not engaged in 
such activity for a considerable time.  Those in favour of raising awareness considered 
that it could assist in strengthening the co-operative philosophy.  Employees noted that 
their credit unions did not engage with the membership with regard to education or 
training.  External communication and engagement centres on the services offered not 
the co-operative ideal.  Members argued that their credit union should have taken 
measures to attract younger people more than a decade before.  According to these 
members, the current situation is the result of lack of marketing and incentives, areas 
where investor-owned banks excel.  Credit unions offer little of no co-operative-related 
training to their employees and members.  Furthermore, no attempt has been made to 
educate younger generations or the general public; credit unions are characterized by 
an ageing membership.  These finding concur with those of Oczkowski, Krivokapic-
Skoko and Plummer (2013) and Novkovic (2006), who found a general disconnect 
between co-operatives and the training/educating agenda.   
 
6th Co-operation among Co-operatives 
The employees interviewed were in favour of collaboration.  They saw potential in the 
merger of credit unions which may provide a more secure financial base and longer-
term sustainability.  The focus group results were mixed on this topic.  Many members 
saw benefit in a merger programme, but others felt that the weaker credit unions would 
unfairly benefit from the endeavours of those more favourably placed.  The individual 
interviews’ results are in line with existing literature.  They are expected to work together 
to overcome common problems and to exchange knowledge and experiences (CSSDA, 
2005).  Those focus group members who focused more on self-interest are at odds with 
the general co-operative literature.  However as noted earlier, self-interest and 
protectionism can also be a rationale for establishing a co-operative.  
 
7th Concern for the community 
Employees suggested that credit unions could assist their members and their 
communities by becoming more engaged and supportive.  Furthermore, given the 
challenging financial situation, employees suggested that credit unions could reduce the 
amount of loan instalments and interest rates, extend the repayment period of loans, 
offer new products and support a legislative change offering protection for borrowers’ 
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homes.  Additionally, employees argued that even under these conditions, credit unions 
can assist their surrounding communities by offering financial services in remote areas 
even for a few days per month, by organising fund raising activities and by offering 
social work.  Similarly, the focus groups’ data indicate that even though the intention of 
credit unions to provide to the society were evident, e.g., by lowering the loan interest 
rates or by providing scholarships, however, due to the transfer of 99% of the shares to 
the state, members felt that they could not decide for themselves about the kind and 
extent of social expenditure.  These findings are similar to Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko 
and Plummer’s (2013) who found that the majority of co-operatives assisted their 
community.   
Discussion 
 
With regards to the 1st principle, the results support the findings of researchers 
(Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; ICA, 2012), with regards to the fact that credit 
unions are indeed open and voluntary organisations.   
 
With respect to the 2nd principle, the results show that the majority of the membership 
do not participate, something that contradicts best practice, (Fonteyne, 2007) but does 
reflect the outcome of a number of studies (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo. 2008; Nilsson, 
Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  As to the possible reasons for a lack of members’ 
participation, the present study’s findings support existing academic research, i.e. 
members feel that they are not able to influence decision making and have become 
dissatisfied with specific decisions (Edwards, 2013; Hakelius and Hansson, 2016).  
Other reasons for members’ lack of involvement include the loss of local identity, a 
finding that confirms that of Nilsson and Svendsen, (2011); free riding, identified also by 
Edwards (2013) and; time horizon issues identified by Osterberg and Nilsson (2009).  
Finally, this research identified poor communication as a potential reason for lack of 
participation and lack of encouragement to participate, issues that were also identified 
by researchers such as Barraud-Didier, Henninger and El Akremi (2012).   
 
As far as the 3rd principle is concerned, the present research seems to contradict the 
findings of researchers (Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013), who 
assume that when the need arises, members will provide financial assistance to their 
credit union.  What the present research brings to the academic discussion is that in 
times of uncertainty and fear, members may not be interested in the common good but 
instead may try to safeguard their personal wealth and interests (self-preservation).   
 
With regards to the 4th principle, studies tend to support that co-operatives remain 
independent of the state (Atherton et al., 2011; ICA, 2012; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko 
and Plummer, 2013), however, the findings of this study suggest that unless the capital 
base is robust, as noted above, the membership will not invest further.  Capital accrued 
in the “good times” must be sufficient to weather the storms of a downturn, if not the 
state may act.  
 
The results relating to the 5th principle indicate that credit unions may not be investing in 
educating and training; a requirement noted by Birchall and Ketilson (2009).  The 
present study’s findings seem to be in line with those of Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko 
and Plummer (2013), i.e. co-operative-related training may not be as common as 
expected, and this may lead to the reduction of members’ participation.   
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With regards to the findings related to the 6th principle, co-operative collaboration was 
found to be desirable, in line with Birchall and Ketilson (2009), however, the 
membership rated personal interest more highly than mutual co-operation, which is 
more in line with the findings of Novkovic (2006) who found evidence that the co-
operation among co-operatives was only superficial.   
 
Finally, with regards to the 7th principle, the results indicate that credit unions take care 
of their surrounding communities, something that is in line with what Novkovic (2006) 
and Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013) say.  What is new based on the 
current study is that, in adverse times, credit unions may restrict such undertakings.  
 
Based on the above, the research suggests that within credit unions every effort is 
made to deliver on the 6th principle (co-operation), but the 2nd (democracy) and 5th 
(education) are essentially ignored.  There was some evidence that the 1st (voluntary 
and open), 3rd (economic participation), 4th (autonomy), and 7th (community) principles 
were in the past considered and partially adhered to, but given the State intervention 
their future adherence is uncertain.  These results may have been influenced by the 
current Cypriot financial situation, but none the less they seem well aligned to those of 
Wilson and McLean (2012), i.e. as time passes, the co-operative principles become less 
important to the membership. 
 
The credit unions no longer appeared to deliver the key co-operative principle of 
engagement; the membership was alienated from decision making and governance.  
The majority of the membership were disengaged; this renders the mutuality of 
governance vulnerable to erosion over time; this finding echoes previous studies 
(Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008; Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  Weakened 
governance may allow a small group of members (an “elite”) to take control or allow 
management to operate with relative impunity.  
 
Co-operative governance may also be undermined by the “temporal” demutualization of 
credit unions, as was the case in Cyprus, where, the state became a 99% shareholder.  
By doing so, the governance structure was overturned, eliminating any member-based 
controls and restricting controls to those imposed by the governmental officials.  
Moreover, state ownership has negatively affected the governance structure, as the 
removal of the member based Board of Directors has increased the asymmetry of 
information.  A similar effect may have been caused by the mergers of credit unions, as 
the increase in the geographical area, the closure of many branches and the rotation of 
employees.   
 
 
Conclusion, limitations and future research 
 
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first time that the adherence to co-operative 
principles has been assessed during a period of financial crisis.  This crisis has 
impacted upon autonomy, accountability and indeed trust.  Further, both employees and 
members have cast doubt upon the way the State intervention, resulting in the merger 
of credit unions, has been communicated and managed.  The future of the credit union 
movement in Cyprus is at best uncertain.  
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General community engagement, as well as membership engagement and influence, 
have been declining.  This combined with a lack of co-operative education and training, 
has over the years led to the alienation of the membership.  In particular, there is 
evidence of a loss of trust, distinctiveness, cohesion and support.  It seems that co-
operative-related training should be a matter of systematic, structured and organised 
effort, particularly during crises.  Moreover, this research has identified a divergence of 
views regarding the direction to be taken; employees stress the need for financial 
expediency, while the membership point to a greater need for social cohesion and 
action.  These views, although no doubt influenced by the State intervention, are the 
result of a protracted period of general disengagement; the membership from the credit 
union, coupled with employees’ and governance disengagement from the underpinning 
co-operative principles.  
 
This paper set out to explore the extent to which co-operative principles still resonated 
with both the management (employees) and the membership.  Co-operatives are alive 
and well.  However, there is growing evidence that in general the principles are no 
longer a universal guide to governance and accountability.  The credit unions that 
formed the basis of this research have long since departed from adherence to the 
founding principles.  To all intents and purposes they are run by the employees for the 
benefit of the credit union (performance) rather than by the membership for the 
community (mutual wellbeing).  Had the credit unions adhered to the principles and the 
membership maintained a guiding influence would they have remained independent, 
through the financial crisis is a matter for conjecture.  What is far more certain is that 
credit unions, do not offer the utopian alternative that many had alluded to post the 2008 
crisis.  Co-operatives, their underpinning rationale and guiding principles, were, as 
noted previously, proposed as an alternative means of delivering financial services.  
This paper and associated research cast doubts on the validity of such claims. 
 
The findings of this research cannot be generalised to all forms of financial co-
operatives nor geographical regions.  However, this does not hinder “logical 
generalizations” that may have within comparable settings (Popay, Rogers and 
Williams, 1998, p.348).  Unfortunately, the research coincided with State intervention to 
avoid a worsening crisis developing within the credit union sector; this could not but 
impact upon the views, aspirations and emotions of the stakeholders as captured by this 
research.   
 
The authors consider that similar research in other geographical areas and in other 
types of co-operatives may be useful in identifying the extent to which co-operative 
principles guide co-operatives’ operations in practice.  If the co-operative movement is 
to remain relevant and impactful, then it must move with the times and find ways of re-
energising a more youthful and globally networked membership.  This study essentially 
asked what has gone wrong.  Why aren’t credit unions and co-operative banking more 
impactful?  Clearly the findings suggest a lack of adherence to the underpinning 
principles.  This seems to have steadily eroded membership engagement.  As part of a 
wider study this research has moved on to examine that can be done to rejuvenate 
engagement and align mutual benefits.  
 
 
 
Page 15 of 19 
References: 
 
ALEXOPOULOS Y. AND GOGLIO S, 2011, “Financial Cooperatives: Problems and 
Challenges in the Post-Crisis Era”, Journal of Rural Cooperation, 39(1), 35-48. 
 
ATHERTON J., BIRCHALL J., MAYO E. AND SIMON G., 2011, “Think Piece 7: 
Practical tools for defining co-operative and mutual enterprise”, Co-operatives 
UK. [Online].  Available at: http://www.uk.coop/sites/storage/public/downloads/co-
operative_id.pdf [Accessed on 11 February 2013].   
 
BARRAUD-DIDIER, V., HENNINGER, M. C., AND EL AKREMI, A., 2012, “The 
relationship between members’ trust and participation in the governance of 
cooperatives: The role of organizational commitment”, International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.1-24. 
 
BICKLE R. AND WILKINS A., 2000, “Co-operative Values, Principles and Future-a 
values basis to building a successful co-operative business”, Journal of co-
operative Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 179-205. 
 
BIRCHALL, J., 1997, “Co-operative values and principles: a commentary”, Journal of 
co-operative Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 70-94. 
 
BIRCHALL J., AND KETILSON L.H., 2009, “Resilience of the Cooperative Business 
Model in Times of Crisis”, International Labour Organization Sustainable 
Enterprise Programme. 
 
CABO P. AND REBELO J., 2014, “The Efficiency of the Portuguese Agricultural Credit 
co-operatives Governance Model”, Ciriec, Working Paper no. 2014/16.   
 
CABO P. AND REBELO J., 2015, “Differences in Portuguese credit institutions' 
lending and investment behaviour in a time of slump”, Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics 86:3 2015. 
 
CHAVES R., SOLER F. AND SAJARDO A., 2008, “Co-operative Governance: the 
case of Spanish Credit co-operatives”, Journal of co-operative studies, 41(2), 
30-37.   
 
COOK, L.M., 1995, “The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional 
Approach”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 
1153-1159. 
 
CO-OPERATIVE CENTRAL BANK (CCB), 2013, “Report and Consolidated Financial 
Statements for the year ended 31 December 2013”, On line, 
http://www.ccb.coop.com.cy/userfiles/f8ce1af3-1709-4976-a785-
1a5a8d552da1/COOPconsolFS2013.pdf, Site accessed on15 March 2017. 
 
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES SUPERVISION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
OF CYPRUS, (CSSDA), 2005, “The co-operative principles in Cyprus”, 
[Online], Available at: 
Page 16 of 19 
<http://www.cssda.gov.cy/cssda/cssda.nsf/All/172DC852F3B3692AC225710F0
03D92A7/$file/ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΤΙΚΕΣ%20ΑΡΧΕΣ%20ΣΤΗΝ%20ΚΥΠΡΟ.pdf> 
[Accessed on 15 September 2012].  
 
CUEVAS C. AND FISCHER K., 2006, “Cooperative Financial Institutions Issues in 
Governance, Regulation, and Supervision”, The World Bank. World Bank 
Working Paper No. 82. 
 
EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF CO-OPERATIVE BANKS (EACB), 2017a, “Co-
Operative Banks: Driving Societal And Economic Growth.  Annual report 2016”.  
[Online].  Available at: 
<http://v3.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/annual_repo
rts/eacb_annual_report_2016.pdf> [Accessed on 1 March 2018].  
 
EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF CO-OPERATIVE BANKS (EACB), 2017b, “The Co-
operative difference: Sustainability, Proximity, Key Statistics as of 31-12-16 
(Financial Indicators)”.  [Online].  Available at: 
<http://v3.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/key_figures/final_eacb-
tias_2016_key_statistics.pdf> [Accessed on 1 March 2018]. 
 
EDWARDS, V.L., 2013, “A theory of participation for 21st century governance”, 
International Journal of Organization theory and behavior, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-
28. 
 
FAJARDO GARCIA, G., 2012, “Cooperative finance and cooperative identity”, Euricse 
Working Paper, N.045|12.  [Online].  Available at: 
<http://www.euricse.eu/sites/euricse.eu/files/db_uploads/documents/13583472
06_n2283.pdf> [Accessed on 1 March 2013].  
 
FARRANDS C., 2011, “The Guardian: Letter: Financial engineering and the crisis in 
care”, The Guardian, London (UK), [Online], 14 June 2011.  Available at: 
<http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/13
7E138B82DBFAB8/0E3F887442B432B5?s_lang=en-US> [Accessed on 9 
October 2011].  
 
FERRI G., 2012, “Credit Cooperatives: Challenges and Opportunities in the New 
Global Scenario”, Euricse Working Paper, N.031/12.  Euricse, [Online]. 
Available at: 
<http://www.euricse.eu/sites/euricse.eu/files/db_uploads/documents/13343097
23_n2044.pdf> [Accessed on 1 March 2013]. 
 
FERRI G., KALMI P. AND KEROLA E., 2014, “Does bank ownership affect lending 
behavior? Evidence from the Euro area”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 48, 
194-209. 
 
FONTEYNE W. AND HARDY C.D., 2011, “Cooperative Banking and Ethics, Past, 
Present and Future”, Ethical perspectives-Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 18.4, 
491-514.  
 
FONTEYNE W., 2007, “Cooperative Banks in Europe- Policy Issues”, International 
Monetary Fund WP/07/159.  [Online], 1 July 2007.  Available at: 
Page 17 of 19 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07159.pdf> [Accessed on 28 
April 2013]. 
 
FULTON M.E. AND GIANNAKAS K., 2012, “The Value of a Norm: Open Membership 
and the Horizon Problem in Cooperatives”, Journal of Rural Cooperation, Vol. 
40, No. 2. 
 
GIBBONS D., 2011, “Held to account:  a review of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
retail banking from the consumer perspective”, Centre for Responsible Credit.  
[Online].  Available from: <http://www.responsible-
credit.org.uk/uimages/File/Held%20to%20Account%20final%20February%2020
11.pdf> [Accessed on 13 March 2013].  
 
HOSSEIN C.S., 2017, “Fringe Banking in Canada: A Study of Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in Toronto's Inner Suburbs”, Canadian Journal 
of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research, Vol. 8, No 1, pp. 29- 43. 
 
GROENEVELD H., 2015, “European co-operative banking actual and factual 
assessment”, TIAS Business School, Tilburg University and Eindhoven 
University of Technology, The Netherlands.  
 
HAKELIUS, K. AND HANSSON, H., 2016, “Measuring Changes in Farmers’ Attitudes 
to Agricultural Cooperatives: Evidence from Swedish Agriculture 1993–2013”, 
Agribusiness, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 531-546. 
 
HESSE H., AND ČIHÁK M., 2007, “Cooperative banks and financial stability”, 
International Monetary Fund WP/07/2, [Online] 1 January 2007, Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0702.pdf> [Accessed on 11 
September 2011]. 
 
ICA, 2011, “Co-operative identity, values & principles”, [Online], Available at: 
<http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles> 
[Accessed on 27 August 2011].  
 
ICA, 2012, “Statement on the co-operative Identity”, International Cooperative Alliance 
(ICA), [Online], Available at: <http://www.ica.coop/coop/principles.html> 
[Accessed on 25 July 2012].  
 
JONES P.A., 2012, “Strategies for growth.  A research study into the progress and 
development of credit unions in the North East of England and Cumbria”, LJMU 
and The Northern Rock Foundation, Newcastle. 
 
JONES P.A., 2016, “British credit unions: Transformation and Challenge”, in 
Karafolas, S. Editor, "Credit Cooperative Institutions in European Countries", 
Springer International Publishing Switzerland. 
 
KELLY C., 2014, “Failings in management and governance.  Report of the independent 
review into the events leading to the co-operative Bank's capital shortfall, Sir 
Christopher Kelly, 30 April 2014”, [Online], Available at: 
<http://www.thekellyreview.co.uk/documents/168461-07-Kelly%20Review-
FINAL%20REPORT-30APR14.pdf> [Accessed on 5 May 2014]. 
Page 18 of 19 
 
MCKILLOP D., AND WILSON, J.0., 2011, “Credit unions: a theoretical and empirical 
overview”, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 20(3), 79-123. 
 
NILSSON, J., AND SVENDSEN, G.T., 2011, “Free Riding or Trust? Why Members 
(do not) Monitor their Cooperatives”, Journal of Rural Cooperation, Vol. 39, No. 
2, pp. 131-150. 
 
NILSSON J., 1996, “The nature of co-operative values and principles: Transaction 
cost theoretical explanations”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
Vol. 67, Issue 4, 633-653. 
 
NILSSON J., KIHLEN A., AND NORELL L., 2009, “Are traditional cooperatives an 
endangered species? About shrinking satisfaction, involvement and trust”, 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 12(4). 
 
NOVKOVIC S., 2006, “Co-operative business: the role of co-operative principles and 
values”, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 39(1), 5-15. 
 
NOVKOVIC S., 2008, “Defining the co-operative difference”. The Journal of Socio-
Economics 37.6, 2168-2177. 
 
O'BRIEN J., 2011, “Global financial crisis points to bankruptcy of policymakers: 
ANALYSIS A return to the spirit of Bretton Woods is not only desirable but also 
essential”, Irish Times, Dublin, Ireland. [Online], 11 April 2011.  Available at: 
<http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/13
68A66E0E277578/0E3F887442B432B5?s_lang=en-US> [Accessed on 7 
September 2011]. 
 
OCZKOWSKI E., KRIVOKAPIC-SKOKO B. AND PLUMMER K., 2013, “The meaning, 
importance and practice of the co-operative principles: Qualitative evidence 
from the Australian co-operative sector”, Journal of co-operative Organization 
and Management, 1(2), 54-63. 
 
OSTERBERG, P., AND NILSSON, J., 2009, “Members’ Perception of Their 
Participation in the Governance of Cooperatives: The Key to Trust and 
Commitment in Agricultural Cooperatives”, Agribusiness, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 
181–197. 
 
PAPAGEORGIOU K., 2004, “Sustainable co-operative Economy”, Stamoulis 
Publications, Athens, Greece.  
 
PARNELL E., 1995, “Reinventing the co-operative Enterprises for the 21st century”, 
Greek translation for the Agricultural University of Athens 1999. 
 
PHILNEWS, 2016, “The process for the flotation of Cooperative Central Bank on the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange has started”, [Online], Available at: 
<http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/oikonomia-kypros/146/310045/prochora-i-
eisagogi-tou-synergatismou-sto-chrimatistirio>, [Accessed on 22 April 2016]. 
 
PHILNEWS, 2018, “Major players in the market Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic Bank”, 
[Online], Available at: 
Page 19 of 19 
<http://www.philenews.com/oikonomia/kypros/article/541825/kyriarchoi-paiktes-
stin-agra-trapeza-kyproy-kai-elliniki>, [Accessed on 18 June 2018]. 
 
POPAY J., ROGERS, A. AND WILLIAMS G., 1998, “Rationale and standards for the 
systematic review of qualitative literature in health services research”, 
Qualitative Health Research Vol. 8, Issue. 3, 341-351. 
 
RICHTER R., 2009, “Who Listened?  Unappreciated Teachings of New Institutional 
Economics Related to the Financial Crisis of 2008”, Kredit und Kapital, vol. 42, 
no. 4, 478-486, [Online], 29 June 2009, Available at: <http://www.uni-
saarland.de/fak1/fr12/richter/publ/Kredit&Kapital2.pdf> [Accessed on 18 
September 2011].  
 
SABATINI F., MODENA F. AND TORTIA E., 2014, “Do cooperative enterprises create 
social trust?”, Small Bus Econ, 42, 621-641. 
 
SHAW L., 2007, “Overview of Corporate Governance Issues for co-operatives", Paper 
presented at the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Working Meeting on 
Corporate Governance and co-operatives, London, 8 February.  [Online].  
Available at: 
<http://www.cemi.com.au/sites/all/publications/GCGF_Discussion_Paper_Corpor
ate_Governance_Issues_for_Cooperatives_070108.pdf> [Accessed on 26 
October 2015]. 
 
SPEAR R., 2004, “Governance in Democratic member-based organizations”, Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics Volume 75, Issue 1, 33-59. 
 
WILSON F. AND MACLEAN D., 2012, “The Big Society, values and cooperation”, 
Work, Employment and Society, Vol.26, Issue 3, 531- 541.  
 
YAIR L. AND DAVIS P. 2008, “Cooperatives as the "Enfants Terribles" of Economics: 
Some Implications for the Social Economy”, The Journal of Socio-Economics 
37(6): 2178-2188. 
 
